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Abstract  
 
Accuracy of memory performance per se is an imperfect reflection of the cognitive activity  
 
(awareness states) that underlies performance in memory tasks. The aim of this research is to  
 
investigate the effect of varied visual and interaction fidelity of immersive Virtual Environments on  
 
memory awareness states. A between groups experiment was carried out to explore the effect of  
 
rendering quality on location-based recognition memory for objects and associated states of  
 
awareness. The experimental space, consisting of two interconnected rooms was rendered either flat-  
 
shaded or using radiosity rendering. The computer graphics simulations were displayed on a stereo  
 
head-tracked Head Mounted Display. Participants completed a recognition memory task after  
 
exposure to the experimental space and reported one of four states of awareness following object  
 
recognition. These reflected the level of visual mental imagery involved during retrieval, the  
 
familiarity of the recollection and also included guesses. Experimental results revealed variations in  
 
the distribution of participants' awareness states across conditions while memory performance failed  
 
to reveal any. Interestingly, results revealed a higher proportion of recollections associated with  
mental imagery in the flat-shaded condition. These findings comply with similar effects revealed in  
 
two earlier studies summarized here, which demonstrated that the less 'naturalistic' interaction  
 
interface or interface of low interaction fidelity provoked a higher proportion of recognitions based  
 
on visual mental images.  
 
 
 
Keywords: I.3.3 [Computer Graphics]: Three-Dimensional Graphics and Realism, Virtual Reality. I.3.6 Methodology and  
 
Techniques, Interaction techniques.  
 
 
 
 
1 Introduction  
 
1.1 Fidelity  
 
It is not computationally feasible to be immersed into an interactive artificial environment which  
 
exactly mimics the panoply and complexity of sensory experiences associated with a real world  
 
scene. For a start, it is technologically challenging to control all of the sensory modalities to render  
 
the exactly equivalent sensory array as that produced by real world interaction. The mapping from the  
 
real world environment to a computer graphics environment is mediated by environmental or visual  
 
fidelity [33]. The term visual fidelity refers to the degree to which visual features in the Virtual  
 
Environment (VE) conform to visual features in the real environment. Within this area, one can  
 
distinguish between physical realism, in which the synthetic scene is an accurate point-by-point  
 
representation of the spectral radiance values of the real scene; photorealism, in which the synthetic  
 
scene produces the same visual response as the real scene even if the physical energy depicted from  
 
the image is different compared to the real scene; and finally functional realism, in which the same  
 
information is transmitted in real and synthetic scenes while users perform visual tasks targeting  
 
transfer of training in the real world [12]. Since a VE is, by its very nature interactive, the question  
 
also arises about how "real" the interactive qualities of the VE might be. Interface or interaction  
fidelity refers to the degree to which the simulator technology (visual and motor) is perceived by a  
 
human participant to simulate the operational equipment and the actual real world task situation. It is  
 
argued that training for instance, in a VE with maximum fidelity would result in transfer of training  
 
similar to real-world training as the two environments would be impossible to differentiate [33].  
 
 
 
 
Visual and interaction fidelity relate to system, rendering or display characteristics. There is always a  
 
trade-off between visual/interaction fidelity and computational complexity. With today's technology,  
 
when visual (or interaction) fidelity is increased, the system responsiveness decreases resulting in  
 
reduced frame rate and added visual/tracking latency [23]. Robust metrics are therefore essential in  
 
order to assess the fidelity of VE systems comprising of computer graphics imagery, display  
 
technologies and 3D interaction metaphors across a range of application fields. Apart from  
 
optimization of technological characteristics such as resolution, Field-of-View (FoV), latency, etc.,  
 
one common belief is that task performance should serve as a fidelity metric for VE systems that  
 
mainly target transfer of training into a real world environment [3]. Training in a flight simulator  
 
should result in positive transfer of training in the real-world. The challenge is to identify the  
 
minimum system characteristics related to computational power and cost in order to achieve this goal.  
 
 
 
 
1.2 Memory for Virtual Places  
 
 
The utility of certain VEs for training such as flight simulators is predicated upon the accuracy of the  
 
spatial representation formed in the VE. Spatial memory tasks, therefore, are often incorporated in  
 
benchmarking processes when assessing the fidelity of a VE simulation. Spatial awareness is  
 
significant for human performance efficiency of such tasks as they require spatial knowledge of an  
environment [3], [4], [5], [11], [21], [26]. A central research issue therefore for real-time VE  
 
applications for training is how participants mentally represent an interactive computer graphics  
 
world and how their recognition and memory of such worlds correspond to real world conditions  
 
[23]. Previous research has examined the variables that communicate transfer of spatial knowledge  
 
and discuss the form and development of spatial representation in VE training in relation to either  
 
real-world training or training with maps, photographs and blueprints [29], [3], [5]. The suitability of  
 
VE systems as effective training mediums is examined and concluded to be as effective as map or  
 
blueprint training [29], [5]. Configurational knowledge acquisition based on estimation of absolute  
 
distances and directions between known points could yield similar effects to training with  
 
photographs and real world training [3]. Moreover, the effects of tactile, olfactory, audio and visual  
 
sensory cues on participants' memory recall of a building were investigated [10]. Two levels of visual  
 
detail were considered reducing texture resolution with or without ambient auditory stimulation,  
 
olfactory stimulation and tactile stimulation. No significant main effect was revealed on spatial layout  
 
recall. Accurate recall of objects' locations was significantly higher when tactile cues and olfactory  
 
cues were incorporated into the environment. Generally, experimental post exposure methodologies  
 
for spatial recall investigations across conditions of varied visual or interaction fidelity range from  
 
questionnaires [11] to drawing sketches of a space after exposure [4] or applying spatial knowledge  
 
acquired so as to navigate effectively the real world space represented [29], [3], [5]. Relevant  
 
research often aims to identify the minimum system characteristics relevant to rendering  
 
computations and interaction interfaces that would yield the maximum performance of a task or the  
 
maximum sense of presence. However, there is still the need for an overt task which is capable of  
 
being learned and assessed in a quantitative manner. What if the fidelity of a system should be  
 
assessed across a range of applications? Here, the questions may become:  
Can we interrogate human cognitive systems which are activated by interacting with a given  
VE scene, to see if the same cognitive responses can be evoked under varied levels of scene 
fidelity? How can we match the capabilities of the VE system related to visual and interaction  
fidelity to the requirements of the human perceptual and motor systems?  
 
 
 
Because of the wide-range of VE applications and differences in participants across their background,  
 
ability and method of processing information, an understanding of how tasks are undertaken within a  
 
VE complementing what is achieved is significant. Common strategies could therefore be revealed  
 
across a range of applications and tasks. The investigation presented in this paper focuses on the  
 
effect of rendering quality, e.g. perception of objects in a flat-shaded computer graphics rendering  
 
setting versus perception of the same space rendered using radiosity rendering, on observers'  
 
attributions regarding object-location memory recognition. The framework to be presented has been  
 
drawn from traditional memory research adjusted to form an experimental procedure. The main  
 
premise is that accuracy of performance per se is an imperfect reflection of the cognitive activity that  
 
underlies performance in memory tasks [6], [8], [13], [31], [28]. Accurate memory performance can  
 
be supported by: a specific recollection of a mental image or prior experience (remembering);  
 
reliance on a general sense of knowing with little or no recollection of the source of this sense  
 
(knowing); guesses. The sense of knowing can be further divided into two. Firstly, whether the  
 
correct answer is just known without the associated recollection of contextual detail (knowing).  
 
Secondly, the answer feels more familiar than a simple guess but cannot be considered as being  
 
known (familiarity) [8]. According to this theoretical framework, performance accuracy is  
 
supplemented by self-report of these states of awareness during recognition. It could be possible that  
 
varied distribution of awareness states is going to be revealed even when overall memory  
 
performance remains the same across viewing conditions [24], [25].  
The experimental scene utilized in the study presented in this paper consisted of two interconnected  
 
rooms. Central to this work is identifying whether the radiosity rendering (high fidelity - shadows) is  
 
associated with stronger visually induced recollections linked with the 'remember' awareness state  
 
compared to the flat-shaded scene (low fidelity - no shadows) displayed on a stereo head-tracked  
 
Head Mounted Display (HMD). Participants could describe how they achieved their spatial  
 
recollections after exposure to the environment by selecting one of four awareness states, e.g.  
 
'remember', 'know', 'familiar' or 'guess'. These judgments reflect the ability to recall associated  
 
mental images and feelings of familiarity. Interestingly, previous studies adopting a similar  
 
methodology have demonstrated that low interaction fidelity interfaces such as the mouse compared  
 
to head tracking [23] as well as displays such as the HMD compared to the real-world task situation  
 
[24] provoked a higher proportion of visually induced recollections based on the recall of specific  
 
details, while there was no effect of condition upon memory recognition. Desirable variations of  
 
awareness states for specific application purposes, therefore, could be ultimately identified and  
 
generalized. It could be true, for instance, that for flight simulation applications it is crucial for  
 
trainees to achieve a high level of conscious recollections associated with mental images relating to  
 
instruments as opposed to recollections that are confident but not accompanied by the recall of visual  
 
images or memories of events. Results to date show that interfaces of low interaction fidelity induce a  
 
higher amount of recollections based on mental imagery than high fidelity interaction interfaces. In  
 
the study presented here, we explore the effect of visual fidelity on the distribution of memory  
 
awareness states and we endeavor to explain the consistent pattern of results mentioned above [24],  
 
[25], in addition to findings in this paper.  
2. Memory Awareness States  
 
Memory, in the sense of 'information' for subsequent analysis, plays an important role in perceptual  
 
systems such as the visual, auditory, haptic and kinesthetic systems [2]. Remembering and knowing  
 
are two subjective states of awareness associated with memory. Some elements of a learning  
 
experience or of a visual space may be 'remembered' and hence be linked to a specific recollection  
 
event or mental image. Alternatively, they could just pop-out without any specific recollections  
 
associated with them and thus, could be just 'known'. In this context, remembering therefore refers to  
 
experiences of the past in which previous events are recreated with the awareness of reliving those  
 
events and experiences mentally. Knowing refers to experiences in which there is no awareness in  
 
reliving particular events or experiences. Tulving [31] was the first to suggest the dissociation  
 
between 'remembering' and 'knowing' as an important means of differentiation in the quality of the  
 
experience participants have following recognition memory. He provided the first demonstration that  
 
these responses can be made in a memory test. Across several experiments participants were  
 
instructed to report their states of awareness at the time they recalled or recognized words they had  
 
previously encountered in a study list. If they remembered what they experienced at the time they  
 
encountered the word, they made a 'remember' response. If they were aware they had encountered  
 
the word in the study list but did not remember anything they experienced at that time, they expressed  
 
a 'know' response. The results indicated that participants could quite easily distinguish between both  
 
experiences of remembering and knowing.  
 
 
 
 
There have been two major approaches that have attempted to explain the remember-know paradigm;  
 
the systems approach and the process approach. The systems approach has focused on attributing  
 
different memory systems to remember and know responses, and was advocated by Tulving [32]. In  
contrast, the process approach suggests that remember and know responses reflect different  
 
processing strategies. Despite the tensions between these two theoretical approaches it has been  
 
conceded that 'they can be used without commitment to any theory, but simply to provide  
 
information on how various phenomena, including memory disorders, are characterised  
 
experientially' [13]. As one cannot make assumptions on what participants experience mentally from  
 
only their performance, the subjective report of states of awareness provides a valuable research tool.  
 
Subsequent research to [32], summarised in [13] indicated that the two states of awareness are  
 
functionally independent as they are influenced differently, in systematic ways by different  
 
experimental manipulations. There is also some preliminary evidence that the distinction between  
 
'remembering' and 'knowing' reflects a difference in brain activity at the time of encoding [29].  
 
Additionally, remembering and knowing do not correspond to a number of other dichotomies  
 
including the distinction between explicit and implicit memory and the distinction between  
 
conceptual and perceptual processes [13].  
 
 
 
 
There is further evidence showing that know responses can be differentiated into 'know' responses  
 
and 'familiar responses. A 'familiar' response can be based on transient feelings of familiarity that  
 
can thus be differentiated from 'know' responses [8]. 'Familiarity' can be defined as the feeling that  
 
something has been encountered or experienced recently, although nothing about this recent  
 
occurrence can be remembered [8]. 'Know' responses, on the other hand, represent highly familiar  
 
memory items that may come to mind without recollecting any particular encounter or any feeling of  
 
a recent encounter and cannot be placed. Earlier research has demonstrated that these finer grained  
 
judgments could be dissociated from each other, just as different source memory judgments can [8],  
 
[16]. Both 'familiar' and 'know' responses were therefore used in the current study.  
Lately, there has been some argument that rather than capturing system or process differences in  
 
memory function, remember and know responses simply reflect the varying levels of confidence with  
 
which particular responses are made [17]. This model postulates that remember responses reflect  
 
stronger memory traces and are made using a conservative response criterion. On the other hand,  
 
know responses reflect weaker memory traces and are made using a more lenient response criterion.  
 
However, a number of studies have shown that there is no necessary relationship between confidence  
 
levels and states of subjective experience [8], [14], [15]. In a study comparing a real-world task  
 
situation and VEs of varied interaction fidelity, positive correlations were identified between  
 
remember/know and confidence scores and negative correlations between familiar/guess and  
 
confidence scores, however, these results were not consistent and could not differentiate between  
 
remember and know or between familiar and guess responses [25]. A confidence scale, therefore,  
 
cannot communicate or predict the types of awareness states associated with memory performance.  
 
Gardiner, 2000, concludes: '… psychology of memory should take on board subjective reports of  
 
conscious states and not just rely on more conventional measures of performance. This evidence has  
 
established that the essential subjectivity of remembering and knowing does not make reports of these  
 
states of awareness intractable to science' [13].  
 
 
 
 
3. Materials and Methods  
 
3.1 Apparatus  
 
The VEs were presented in stereo at VGA resolution on a Kaiser Electro-optics Pro-View 30 Head  
 
Mounted Display with a Field-of-View comprising 30 degrees diagonal. An Intersense Intertrax2 3  
 
degrees of freedom tracker was utilized for 360 degrees rotational movement. As regards translational  
movement, a simple wireless device was custom-made (Figure 3). This device consisted of a small  
 
perspex box housing simple push buttons allowing for forward (green button) and backward (red  
 
button) navigation relative to the users view direction as detected by the head tracker. The  
 
computational overhead of using this device was negligible because it emulated and replaced the  
 
USB keyboard. The application ran on a standard PC. Despite the difference in polygon count  
 
between the flat-shaded and the radiosity environment the frame rate was retained constant across  
 
conditions at 22 frames per second.  
 
 
 
3.2 Visual Content  
 
According to the group they were assigned to, participants completed the same memory recognition  
 
task in one of the following two viewing conditions:  
 
- HMD radiosity condition: A high quality, interactive radiosity simulation of the space on a stereo  
 
head-tracked HMD; referred to as the HMD radiosity condition  
 
- HMD flat-shaded condition: A low quality, interactive flat-shaded simulation of the same space on  
 
a stereo head-tracked HMD; referred to as the HMD flat-shaded condition.  
 
The experimental space consisted of two interconnected rooms including primitive objects (boxes,  
 
spheres or pyramids) scattered around each room in various locations (Figure 1,2). One room  
 
included a door and the other a window. Each environment varied considerably with regard to  
 
shadows. The flat-shaded environment did not include any. Radiosity algorithms, however, display  
 
view-independent diffuse interreflections in a scene assuming the conservation of light energy in a  
 
closed environment (Figure 1). All energy emitted or reflected by every surface is accounted for by  
 
its reflection from or absorption by other surfaces. The surfaces of a scene are subsequently broken  
 
up into a finite number of n discrete patches, each of which is assumed to be of finite size, emitting  
and reflecting light uniformly over its entire area. The Lightscape radiosity renderer was used and the  
 
result of the radiosity solution was an interactive three-dimensional representation of light energy in  
 
the environment allowing for soft shadows and colour bleeding that contributed towards a near-  
 
photorealistic image without any specular reflections. The final ~40,000 polygon scene was rendered  
 
with one incandescent light source in each room (Figure 1). The luminance level of the scenes was  
 
maintained similar; luminance readings were taken in various locations for both viewing conditions  
 
using a standard luminance meter.  
 
 
 
3.3 Participants  
 
30 participants were recruited from the University of Sussex, UK postgraduate population. A between  
 
subjects design was used. The 30 participants were therefore separated into 2 groups of 15  
 
corresponding to two fidelity conditions (flat-shaded vs. radiosity). 80% of the participants in each  
 
group were male and all used computers a great deal in their daily activities. Groups were also  
 
balanced for age (respective mean 26, std 5) and gender. Participants in all conditions were naive as  
 
to the purpose of the experiment. All participants had normal or corrected to normal vision and no  
 
reported neuromotor impairment.  
 
 
 
 
3.4 Procedure  
 
The interpupilary distance (IPD) was measured for each participant with a common ruler before  
 
exposure and the stereo application's parallax was set accordingly to reduce possible visual stress  
 
during exposure. Participants were seated on a swivel chair for the whole duration of exposure to the  
 
VE wearing the HMD. They could move around 360 degrees.  
 
Figure 1. Flat-shaded rendering (first column), radiosity rendering (second column) of the experimental space consisting  
 
of two interconnected rooms.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Stylistic plan view of the experimental space as given to participants after exposure (excluding the letters P,S,B  
 
signifying the presence of either a pyramid, a sphere or a box in those locations).  
Figure 3. Custom-made navigation device.  
 
 
 
 
They held the wireless device allowing for backward/forward translational movement in the direction  
 
of the head-tracked movement. Restrictions of navigation applied were based on collision detection  
 
and boundaries of head movements. The exposure time was 120 seconds. Idle time, direction of idle  
 
time as well as navigation routes were monitored through software during exposure.  
 
 
 
 
Participants were instructed to look around the room but were not explicitly informed about the  
 
nature of the task. After 120 seconds exposure to the VE, they were asked to complete the  
 
experimental task. The memory recognition questionnaire was designed to test the participants'  
 
memory recognition of the geometric shape of the 20 objects in the experimental space. This was  
 
followed by self-report of memory awareness states. Stylistic spatial diagrams were administered  
 
together with the task questionnaire that consisted of 20 multiple-choice questions representing the 20  
 
objects in the scene (Figure 2). Every question included three possible answers, e.g. box, sphere or  
 
pyramid and a confidence scale with five possible states: No confidence, Low confidence, Moderate  
 
confidence, Confident, Certain. The letters P, B and S in Figure 2 indicate the location of a Pyramid  
 
(P), Box (B) or Sphere (S) at the numbered positions and were not included in the diagram  
administered. Every question also incorporated an awareness states report for every recognition based  
 
on the memory awareness methodology offering four choices: Remember, Know, Familiar or Guess.  
 
The participants were required to report on the shape of the object in each numbered position on the  
 
diagram starting with the positions they were more confident they remembered. The memory  
 
recognition questionnaire did not force participants to start from a specified position in the room  
 
offering the capability to report, initially, their most confident recollections. A pilot study was  
 
conducted in order to determine the number of objects in the scene in relation to the exposure time so  
 
as to avoid possible floor or ceiling effects e.g. the task being too easy or too hard. Prior to filling out  
 
the core of the task questionnaire (sample question, Appendix), participants were given instructions  
 
designed to explain what the memory awareness states depicted as follows:  
 
- REMEMBER means that you can visualise clearly the object in the room in your head, in that  
 
particular location. You virtually 'see' again elements of the room in your mind.  
 
- KNOW means that you just 'know' the correct answer and the alternative you have selected just  
 
'stood out' from the choices available. In this case you can't visualise the specific image or  
 
information in your mind.  
 
- FAMILIAR means that you did not remember a specific instance, nor do you know the answer. It  
 
may seem or feel more familiar than any of the other alternatives.  
 
- GUESS means that you may not have remembered, known, or felt that the choice you selected have  
 
been familiar. You may have made a guess, possibly an informed guess, e.g. you have selected the  
 
one that looks least unlikely.  
 
 
 
 
Perceived presence assessments were obtained after acquiring recognition scores employing the  
 
questionnaire reported by Slater et al. in [28] followed by simulator sickness reports utilizing the  
Simulator Sickness Questionnaire (SSQ) reported by Kennedy et al. in [18]. Simulator sickness  
 
reports were also acquired prior to exposure to the VE. Moreover, participants' navigation patterns  
 
were monitored resulting in measures of idle time during exposure across conditions.  
 
 
 
 
3.5 Statistical Analysis  
 
Awareness state data were represented as prior and posterior probabilities. Prior probabilities reflect  
 
on the following: Given that the response of a participant is correct, what is the probability that the  
 
participant has chosen a particular state on that question? Posterior probabilities, on the other hand,  
 
pose the following question: Given that a response of a participant was assigned to one of the four  
 
memory awareness response categories, what is the probability that the response is correct?  
 
 
 
 
Koriat & Goldsmith, 1994 have drawn an important distinction between the amount or quantity  
 
remembered compared to the accuracy or quality of what is remembered. In the quantity analysis  
 
memory awareness states data are represented as a priori or prior probabilities [19]. Although this  
 
notation does not follow the Bayesian probability theory principles for 'prior' probabilities, it is going  
 
to be adopted as such in this paper following the notation of earlier memory research [8], [19]. Prior  
 
probabilities are obtained by calculating the proportions of correct answers falling in each of the four  
 
memory awareness categories for each participant. In the accuracy analysis, correct recall scores are  
 
represented as posteriori or posterior probabilities. In order to calculate posterior probabilities, the  
 
proportion of correct answers from the total of answers given in each memory awareness category is  
 
computed for each participant.  
 
 
xin  
 
 
x'in  
For participant n,  
 
 
is the number of correct answers for the i awareness state,  
 
 
is the number of incorrect answers for the i awareness state,  
 
i = {remember, know, familiar, guess} = {1,2,3,4}  
 
then,  
 
 
Pin  is the prior probability for awareness state i related to participant n,  
 
 
Pin = 4xin  
∑ xin  
i=1  
 
 
P'in  is the posterior probability for awareness state i related to participant n,  
 
 
xin  
P'in =  
xin + x'in  
 
 
 
 
4. Results  
 
The participants completed the memory task including self-report of confidence and awareness states  
 
across the two conditions (flat-shaded and radiosity). The recognition memory scores, the confidence  
 
scores, the presence assessments and idle time measures as well as the prior and posterior  
 
probabilities derived from the memory awareness states dataset were analysed using t-tests and  
 
ANalysis of VAriance (ANOVA) [9].  
 
 
 
 
The total number of objects that were correctly located was counted for each participant (Table 1).  
 
The recognition scores were analysed using a t-test with viewing condition as the between subjects  
factor and participants' object-location recognition scores as the dependent variable. This analysis did  
 
not reveal a significant effect of viewing condition, t (28)= .68, p>0.05.  
 
 
 
 
Confidence reports (No confidence, Low confidence, Moderate confidence, Confident, Certain) were  
 
converted to numerical values ranging from 1 assigned to 'No confidence' and 5 assigned to  
 
'Certain'. The mean confidence scores were analysed using a t-test with viewing condition as the  
 
between subjects factor and participants' confidence scores as the dependent variable (Table 1). This  
 
analysis did not reveal a significant effect of viewing condition, t (28) =.01, p>0.05.  
 
 
 
 
Prior probabilities indicate the proportion of correct answers under each memory awareness state  
 
(Table 2). The prior probabilities were subjected to a 2 (viewing condition: flat-shaded vs. radiosity)  
 
x 4 (awareness state: remember vs know vs familiar vs guess) mixed ANOVA with viewing condition  
 
as a between-subjects factor and awareness state as a within-subjects factor. There was a significant  
 
effect of awareness state, F(3,84)=3.69, p<0.05. The interaction between awareness state and viewing  
 
condition was significant, F(3,84)=6.29, p<0.05. Subsequent one-way ANOVA analysis was  
 
conducted on responses in each of the awareness states separately with viewing condition as the  
 
grouping factor. There was a significant main effect of condition upon the 'remember' awareness  
 
state, F(1,28)=27.28, p<0.01 (Respective Ms. .49 vs. .19, flat-shaded vs radiosity). The proportion of  
 
correct answers associated with the 'remember' awareness state was significantly higher in the  
 
radiosity condition compared to the flat-shaded scene.  
 
 
 
 
Posterior probabilities represent the probability that a memory recall response assigned to each of the  
 
memory awareness states is accurate (Table 3). A participant could have assigned very few responses  
to a particular response category but these could have been always correct. Such a participant would  
 
have a low quantity (proportion) of responses under this specific awareness state, which, however,  
 
were highly accurate. There were participants that did not assign any responses to certain awareness  
 
states resulting in posterior probabilities being calculated reliably for 23 participants. The posterior  
 
probabilities were subjected to a 2 (viewing condition: flat-shaded vs. radiosity) x 3 (awareness state:  
 
remember vs familiar vs guess) mixed ANOVA with viewing condition as a between-subjects factor  
 
awareness state as a within-subjects factor. There was a significant effect of awareness state,  
 
F(3,63)=7.23, p<0.05. The analysis did not produce a significant effect of viewing condition,  
 
F(1,21)=.26, p>0.05. The interaction between awareness state and viewing condition was also not  
 
significant, F(3,63)=1.9, p>0.05.  
 
 
 
 
Correlation analysis between the prior probabilities derived from the awareness states results and  
 
confidence scores as well as memory recognition scores revealed a varied pattern of significant  
 
correlations (Pearson's, n=30):  
 
- There was a significant positive correlation between confidence scores and correct 'know'  
 
responses for the flat shaded condition, r = 0.70, p<0.05  
 
- There was a significant positive correlation between confidence scores, r = 0.69, p<0.05 and  
 
correct 'remember' responses for the radiosity condition.  
 
The flat-shaded environment provoked more correct recollections linked with mental images  
 
communicated via the high proportion of correct 'remember' responses although interestingly,  
 
confidence scores positively correlated with correct 'know' responses.  
Viewing condition  
 
Flat -shaded  Radiosity  
 
(n=15)  (n=15)  
 
Task scores  11.2 (4.2)  10.06 (3.39)  
 
(out of 20)  
 
Confidence scores  2.93 (0.66)  2.67 (0.70)  
 
(out of 5)  
 
 
 
Table 1. Means and Standard deviations for accurate object-location recognition and confidence scores as a function of  
 
viewing condition (n = total number of participants per condition).  
 
 
 
Viewing condition  
 
 
 
 
 
Prior  
 
Remember  
 
Prior  
 
Know  
 
Prior  
 
Familiar  
 
Prior  
 
Guess  
 
Flat-shaded  
 
(n=15)  
 
.49(.17)  
 
 
 
.13(.14)  
 
 
 
.13(.14)  
 
 
 
.24(.16)  
 
Radiosity  
 
(n=15)  
 
.19(.12)  
 
 
 
.24(.21)  
 
 
 
.24(.21)  
 
 
 
.30(.25)  
 
 
 
Table 2. Prior probabilities and standard deviations as a function of viewing condition (n = total number of participants  
 
per condition).  
Viewing Condition  
 
 
 
 
 
Posterior  
 
Remember  
 
Posterior  
 
Know  
 
Posterior  
 
Familiar  
 
Posterior  
 
Guess  
 
Flat-shaded  
 
(n=11)  
 
.89(.18)  
 
 
 
.59(.36)  
 
 
 
.32(.37)  
 
 
 
.40(.40)  
 
Radiosity  
 
(n=12)  
 
.67(.37)  
 
 
 
.72(.39)  
 
 
 
.50(.32)  
 
 
 
.48(.22)  
 
 
 
Table 3. Posterior probabilities and standard deviations as a function of viewing condition (n = total number of  
 
participants per condition).  
 
 
 
 
Moreover, confidence scores positively correlated with correct 'remember' responses for the  
 
photorealistic, radiosity condition, although the proportion of correct 'remember' responses assigned  
 
to this viewing condition was lower compared to the flat-shaded condition. Statistical correlation does  
 
not indicate causality and based on memory literature and previous studies in synthetic environments  
 
[24], [25] there is no consistent pattern of correlations identified between confidence scores and  
 
awareness states.  
 
 
 
 
Navigation routes and idle times were recorded. Total idle time in each of the two rooms of the  
 
experimental space across conditions, was subjected to a 2 (viewing condition: flat-shaded vs.  
radiosity) x 2 (time spent in each room: room1 vs room2) mixed ANOVA, with viewing condition as  
 
a between-subjects factor and time spent in each room as a within-subjects factor. In the flat-shaded  
 
condition, the mean time spent in room one was 39 seconds and 81 secs in room two. In the radiosity  
 
condition, the mean time spent in room one was 54 secs and 66 in room two. There was a significant  
 
effect of time spent in each room, F(1,28)=5.80, p<0.05. The interaction between the time spent in  
 
each room and viewing condition was not significant, F(1,28)=1.89, p>0.05. The validity of the  
 
memory recall results reported above is enhanced, given that participant groups spent comparable  
 
amounts of time in each room across conditions. Memory performance is a function of looking time  
 
[7] therefore participants' navigational tendencies could affect memory recognition after exposure. In  
 
the future, similar investigations should also yield the amount of time spent looking at particular  
 
object locations in the experimental space.  
 
 
 
 
There was no effect of viewing condition upon the presence dataset, t=.44, p>0.05, as measured by a  
 
questionnaire [28] (Respective Ms. 3.45 vs. 3.80, flat-shaded vs radiosity). The measuring device  
 
either did not pick up any effect or there was not an effect across conditions as assessed by the  
 
questionnaire. How the degree of 'reality' of the motor response or rendering quality relates to  
 
presence assessments, if at all, remains an open research question [30]. Simulator sickness data  
 
acquired before and after exposure were not significantly different, t=.32, p>0.05. Simulator sickness  
 
symptomatology ratings before and after exposure were extremely low for all participants.  
 
 
 
 
5. Discussion  
 
In previous studies [24] [25] a display such as the HMD coupled with low fidelity motor input such as  
 
mouse navigation when compared to head-tracking appeared to have prevented participants from  
employing non-visually induced recollections and resulted in a larger distribution of correct responses  
 
assigned to the 'remember' awareness state [24], [25]. A similar result was identified in the study  
 
presented here associated to rendering quality rather than to the interaction interface. By decreasing  
 
the degree of 'reality' (interaction fidelity) of the motor response utilizing a mouse or of the rendering  
 
(visual fidelity) being exposed to a flat shaded environment, participants -paradoxically- were more  
 
aware of the visual identity of the recognized object based on mental images. Something less 'real' or  
 
of low interaction/visual fidelity and therefore, less computationally expensive maybe more  
 
attentionally demanding because of its novelty or variation from 'real'. The additional attentional  
 
demands that the low fidelity environment places on the cognitive system may therefore enhance the  
 
memorial experiences associated with it. This would be consistent with previous research that has  
 
indicated that 'remember' responses require more attentional processing in the first instance than  
 
those based on familiarity [27], [6]. Consistent with our assumptions, this investigation showed that  
 
viewing conditions had no impact on the overall accuracy of observers' recognition scores. However,  
 
the viewing condition had an impact on the proportion of correct responses associated to a specific  
 
mental image. Participants' self report of their own states of awareness could, in general, complement  
 
task performance. Such information could be desirable for specific training applications when  
 
cognitive processes complementing behavioural task-related metrics are considered to be essential for  
 
training. Achieving high fidelity could incorporate the need for similar awareness states between a  
 
real-world task situation and its computer graphics simulation, depending on application goals.  
 
 
 
 
The apparently surprising but consistent results of [24], [25] complemented by the results presented  
 
here could also be discussed in relation to mental representations by examining the effect of global  
 
illumination algorithms on spatial awareness. Radiosity takes into account all diffuse inter-reflections  
in the scene excluding specular reflections. Taking input from mental representation theories, Plato  
 
thought that memories were based on images. According to his theory, memories are carved into the  
 
mind much like pictures can be carved on a wax tablet. Plato even took account of individual  
 
differences in terms, for instance, of the 'purity' of the wax and in the ease of carving figures into it.  
 
Moreover, mental imagery is significant since this is a means by which information is learned, stored  
 
and retrieved. Consider how one decides what is the best route to get to work at rush hour in the  
 
morning or if a piece of furniture would fit in one's home. In both cases, imagery is used to carry out  
 
a kind of 'mental simulation' [10]. Is this internal mental simulation 'photorealistic' or is it cartoon-  
 
like, retaining contours of objects rather than colours and shadows? If the latter is true, then certainly,  
 
the flat-shaded condition is closer to participants' mental representations, a fact that may allow more  
 
attention to be allocated to the content of the representation rather than the generation of an  
 
appropriate representation in the first instance. A major bottleneck in using mental imagery could be  
 
the capacity of working memory; this capacity hinges on properties of a passive store and properties  
 
of active imagery operations. Within contemporary models of memory [22] and those of mental  
 
imagery [20], these limitations have been associated with attentional processes.  
 
 
 
 
In this paper we do not suggest that flat-shaded rendering or low visual or interaction fidelity is  
 
adequate for spatial awareness. Global illumination algorithms provide valuable depth cues by  
 
computing sophisticated shadows and diffuse or specular effects which could aid in object  
 
recognition and navigation. Interaction interfaces such as head tracking are intuitive. The research  
 
presented endeavors to comprehend the simulation of cognitive processes rather than simulation of  
 
physics or behavioural simulations and indicates 'how' memory retrieval is communicated from a  
process or memory system point of view. The degree to which an environment recruits attention is  
 
likely to be extremely important.  
 
 
 
 
The blue primary shapes in these experiments, although selected for their similar size and diffuse  
 
colour, are not typical of a real-world scene and lack contextual meaning. Recent work on memory  
 
recognition of schema consistent and inconsistent objects in an academic's office has provided  
 
preliminary suggestions that recollections induced by mental imagery were also associated to low  
 
fidelity viewing conditions for objects which are more intricate [2]. Further work should also explore  
 
the effect of visual detail such as specularity or texture resolution on object recognition.  
 
 
 
 
Generally, current distinctions between differences in visual/spatial representations emerging from  
 
research in cognitive science and neuroscience may apply to mental images as well, with or without  
 
immediate sensory input [10]. Indeed, visual imagery, visual representation and memory are unlikely  
 
to be a unitary concept [22]. They comprise of distinguishable subsystems specialized for performing  
 
particular aspects of cognitive tasks. Distinctions among subsystems of imagery specialized for  
 
particular tasks will become increasingly sophisticated as researchers come to understand better the  
 
varieties of visual representation, in real and synthetic (simulation) worlds. A significant direction for  
 
future research on fidelity of VE simulations will be to develop metrics that will integrate or separate  
 
visual and interaction fidelity into a coherent framework.  
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Appendix  
 
Sample memory awareness states question  
 
 
 
1 Object Location Number:  Bo x  Sphere  Pyramid  
 
Confidence:  No conf.  Low conf.  Moderate conf.  Confident  Certain  
Awareness:  Remember  K no w  Familiar  Guess  
